When Telehealth Prescribing Becomes Drug Trafficking: Lessons From the Done Global Sentencing

Key Takeaways

• The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) enforcement targeting digital health prescribing practices is intensifying, as reflected in the Done Global sentencing — the first criminal prosecution to charge telehealth executives with drug trafficking based on how their platform was designed and operated.
• Federal scrutiny is focused on system-level business decisions, including subscription models, auto-refill features, clinician compensation, and visit-length caps, that may predictably increase controlled-substance prescribing beyond medical necessity.
• Both digital health platforms and individual prescribers face heightened criminal exposure, particularly where platform design overrides clinical judgment, false representations are made to payors, or internal and external warnings about unsafe prescribing are suppressed rather than addressed.

For companies and professionals operating in the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) space, the Done Global prosecution should be required reading. The case marks an important development in DOJ’s approach to controlled-substance enforcement: the use of federal drug trafficking laws against telehealth executives based in significant part on how their platform was designed and operated. More specifically, Done demonstrates that DOJ may use subscription models, automated refill systems, clinician compensation arrangements, and limits on patient visits as evidence that corporate executives knowingly facilitated controlled-substance prescriptions issued outside the usual course of professional practice.

DOJ’s Done Global Prosecution: Why the Sentencing Matters for Telehealth Providers

On July 7, 2026, the DOJ announced the sentencing of two executives of Done Global Inc., a California-based digital mental health company that offered ADHD diagnoses and stimulant prescriptions through a telehealth subscription platform. Founder and CEO Ruthia He received six years in prison and a $1 million fine; fine, while former clinical president David Brody received two years and a $1 million fine. Both were convicted in November 2025 of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, four counts of distribution, and conspiracy to commit health care fraud. He was separately convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice. The sentencing was the first announced under DOJ’s new West Coast Strike Force, covering the Northern District of California, the District of Arizona, and the District of Nevada.

Under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), prescriptions for Schedule II stimulants such as Adderall must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional practice. In the telehealth context, DOJ may rely on platform-level decisions as evidence of intentional drug distribution when those decisions create pressure to prescribe without medical necessity or minimize clinical oversight to the point that prescribing becomes automatic rather than individualized. Done demonstrates that the design and operation of a digital health company’s prescribing infrastructure can become central evidence in a federal drug trafficking prosecution.

DOJ’s case focused on its allegation that Done’s corporate structure was designed to generate controlled-substance prescriptions at scale rather than support individualized clinical decisions. According to DOJ, Done spent more than $40 million on social media advertising intended to persuade consumers they had ADHD, including people with bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and stimulant-induced psychosis whose conditions could be worsened by the drugs Done prescribed. Subscribers paid a monthly fee and received stimulant prescriptions through an automated refill system that renewed prescriptions based on patient requests with little or no follow-up clinical evaluation. DOJ alleged that some patients received Adderall for years without seeing a clinician, including during involuntary psychiatric holds and even after patients had died.

DOJ also alleged that Done’s compensation and personnel practices were designed to override clinical judgment. According to the trial evidence, Done paid clinicians as much as $60,000 per month to sign prescriptions at a pace of one every 30 seconds, limited initial ADHD evaluations to roughly half the length of a standard clinical assessment, and fired clinicians who refused to prescribe. Brody personally authorized 394,324 Schedule II stimulant pills for 6,559 patients he had never met or evaluated and whose records he had not reviewed. As U.S. Attorney Craig Missakian stated, the defendants “made a choice to operate a telehealth platform that ignored medical necessity and as a result put patients at risk.”

DOJ alleged that He and Brody sustained insurance reimbursement for these prescriptions by submitting false prior authorization requests stating that Done followed DSM-5 diagnostic criteria, administered urine drug screens, and had attempted non-stimulant alternatives. According to DOJ, none of those statements was true, and Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial insurers paid more than $12.3 million as a result. When national pharmacy chains blocked Done prescriptions on safety grounds, He formed a separate entity, Mindful Mental Wellness, to circumvent those restrictions and continue dispensing. DOJ further alleged that He obstructed the investigation after receiving a grand jury subpoena by directing employees to move communications to encrypted, disappearing-message platforms, deleting company records, moving operations to China, and secretly obtaining a Chinese travel document while under court supervision.

What This Means for Digital Health Companies

The central lesson from Done is that the case was not limited to individual prescribers who departed from accepted medical practice. DOJ alleged that company executives designed a system to generate controlled-substance prescriptions without effective clinical oversight. The government relied on the platform’s architecture and financial incentives as evidence that it prioritized prescription volume over medical judgment. As Drug Enforcement Administration Administrator Terrance Cole stated, the agency will “continue to pursue and bring to justice those who traffic in prescription drugs for criminal gain,” regardless of whether the operation runs through a technology platform. Done also fits within a broader enforcement focus on technology platforms that structure or facilitate medical decision-making. In 2024, Cerebral entered into a non-prosecution agreement after admitting that it used prescription-rate targets and financial incentives to increase stimulant prescribing, while the recent DMERx convictions imposed criminal liability on executives who operated an internet-based platform designed to generate medically unnecessary doctors’ orders with little or no meaningful patient interaction.

For Digital Health Platforms

For telehealth companies, ensuring that a licensed clinician signs each prescription may not be enough. DOJ may treat the platform itself, including its subscription model, refill automation, visit-length requirements, and compensation structure, as evidence of intent to distribute controlled substances when those features cause prescriptions to issue without individualized clinical assessment. Companies should therefore examine how their technology affects clinical decision-making. Automated refills that proceed without meaningful clinician review, visits too short to permit an adequate evaluation, and compensation tied to prescription volume can be characterized as mechanisms for distribution rather than tools supporting patient care.

Companies should also be prepared to demonstrate how they respond to internal dissent and external warnings. DOJ relied on evidence that Done fired clinicians who refused to prescribe, ignored warnings from families and pharmacies, and continued dispensing to patients who had been hospitalized or had died. Incentive structures and growth-focused metrics without guardrails protecting clinical independence and patient safety may become important evidence in an investigation. Organizations should also enforce record-preservation and litigation-hold protocols before an inquiry arises. Done’s post-subpoena shift to encrypted messaging, deletion of records, and efforts to move operations offshore resulted in a separate obstruction conviction and materially increased the criminal exposure.

For Prescribers and Clinicians

The lessons from Done also apply directly to prescribers. When digital health companies use automated refill systems, impose visit-length constraints, or offer high-volume compensation, clinicians may be asked to authorize prescriptions without a genuine clinical assessment. Prescribers who authorize controlled substances without reviewing patient records, conducting adequate evaluations, or addressing known deficiencies in the platform may face personal criminal exposure under the Controlled Substances Act. Brody’s conviction, based in part on his authorization of 394,324 pills for 6,559 patients he had never met, illustrates the risk of treating a platform-generated prescription queue as an administrative task rather than an exercise of clinical judgment.

What Digital Health Companies Should Do Now

Done confirms that digital health prescribing is a significant DOJ enforcement priority. The government is examining both the medical justification for individual prescriptions and the systems through which controlled substances are prescribed. Organizations should therefore be able to show that their policies, technology, and actual practices protect clinical independence and patient safety rather than subordinate them to growth, efficiency, or prescription volume.